I. The Parable of the Travel Agents
In 1975 the main way to arrange air travel was to dial a telephone to speak with an agent with access to a computer terminal connected There is, as mentioned above, some debate about the size of this effect, but a reduction in appropriability makes it more difficult to generate revenue for any given product.
The welfare analysis of weakened appropriability is somewhat nuanced. For products that already exist, a weakened ability to charge consumers for us promotes transfers from producers to consumers. This transfer is, of course, bad news for producers and, in the short run, good news for consumers.
Moreover, it promotes the transformation of deadweight loss into consumer surplus. This second piece is good news for consumers without offsetting bad news for sellers. 
III. Digitization and Copyright
Copyright law allows creators monopolies over the sale of their creative works. These legal grants of monopoly embody all of the usual bad features of monopoly: they ensure that works will be more expensive than they otherwise might be. (In a zero marginal cost world without perfect price discrimination, these monopolies tend to guarantee that there will be some deadweight loss associated with situations with positive prices).
But this negative feature is supposed to be offset by the monopolies' incentive effects on creation. That is, the prospect of monopoly profits is supposed to provide incentives for bringing new works to market. This is, of course, good for both producers, who get profits and for consumers, who get new products they value above the prices they pay. A simple shorthand for the digital era is that k has fallen while b has risen, so we don't know whether copyright protection would need to be strengthened or weakened to preserve creative incentives existing a few decades ago.
IV. A Research Agenda
We are fortunate to be living in interesting times, that is, through some substantial Second, production at zero marginal cost makes possible marketing arrangements such as pure and mixed bundling, nonlinear pricing, and two-part tariffs that had until recently been largely topics for theoretical speculation, at least in markets for copyright-protected products.
11 See Connolly and Krueger (2006) and Mortimer, Nosko, and Sorensen (2010) .
